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In 2008 the national strategic management unit of
the South African Police Service (SAPS)
completed the first version of the long awaited
Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan (CFPP),
which is ready for implementation. This plan, or
strategy, was an attempt to fill the gap left by the
closure of the Anti-Corruption Unit, but had been
plagued by delays since work started on it in
2002/03. In early 2009 provincial managers were
instructed to begin implementing the strategy. 
Over the next year the ISS will be assessing,
through a series of case studies, the
implementation of the CFPP in stations across the
country. This article presents the findings of the
first of these studies. The findings of this and two
additional case studies will be presented and
analysed in a forthcoming occasional paper.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND
METHODOLOGY
This case study was conducted at the Honeydew
SAPS station, located in the northwest of
Johannesburg. The station was selected for:1
1. Its high crime rate. As one of the country's 169 
priority crime stations, Honeydew has one of
the highest violent crime rates in Gauteng.
This creates a high-stress work environment,
and since those responsible for management
and oversight are likely to be overwhelmed by
the immediate task of dealing with crime,
members may be tempted to engage in illegal
activities. 
2. The diverse urban landscape and population 
of the area. The Honeydew precinct includes a
relatively large and affluent suburban area, a
business district, industrial area, and two
poorer residential areas, Cosmos City (RDP
houses and shacks) and Zandspruit informal
settlement. It has a middle-class to affluent
(predominantly white) population, and a
working-class and poor (predominantly
black) population, including a significant
number of African immigrants. Zimbabwean
residents of Zandspruit have on a number of
occasions been the targets of violent attacks
by residents.
3. The fact that the former station commissioner 
(promoted to cluster commander two months
prior to the fieldwork) is known in Gauteng
as one of the most active in anti-corruption
reform.2
Honeydew police station employs approximately
260 people (including administrative staff) who
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are responsible for an area of 194 square
kilometres that is home to approximately 850 000
residents.
The primary intention of the case study was to
ascertain to what extent the station managers and
staff were aware of the CFPP, and to what extent
the plan was being implemented (if at all). The
secondary purpose of the study was to gain
insight into the organisational culture of the
station; the attitudes of members and managers to
integrity and corruption management; and to
understand whether any action had been taken to
curb corruption, whether guided by the CFPP or
not. The case study was conducted over a period
of approximately six weeks.
The dominant research method was semi-
structured face-to-face interviews conducted with
roughly ten per cent (n=29) of station employees.
These included operational members,
administrative staff, police reservists, new student
constables, students in their probationary year,
and the chair of the Community Policing Forum
(CPF).
Interviews probed:
• Employees' perceptions of discipline and their 
understanding of rules 
• The quality of relationships between junior 
and senior members
• Prior attempts to manage integrity/corruption 
at the station
• Whether corruption is perceived as a problem 
at the station and in the SAPS in general
• What respondents believe could/should be 
done to reduce corruption 
• The perceived cause of corruption, and 
• Whether the respondents knew of any formal 
SAPS anti-corruption initiatives, strategies or
plans, including hotlines
It was initially intended that interviews would be
supplemented through an 'integrity survey' based
on that developed by the late Carl Klockars.3
Unfortunately, despite a number of attempts, the
survey process has not yet been successful and no
usable data have yet been produced.  
The method included observation of the station
environment and members, including their
engagement with clients in the Community
Service Centre (CSC). It was limited by the fact
that it did not include observation of members
outside the station.4
In order to protect the anonymity of subjects,
interview dates and times have not been 
provided, with the exception of interviews with
the former station commissioner and the chair of
the community policing forum (CPF), from
whom permission was received to use this
information. Ranks of commissioned officers are
not mentioned to further ensure their 
anonymity.5
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Discipline
Approximately 40 per cent of respondents felt that
discipline at the station was very good, that rank
was respected, rules strictly enforced, and
corrective action taken against defaulting
members. The majority (60 per cent), however,
expressed mixed feelings. Most of these believed
discipline was good, but made it clear that certain
members – by some accounts half of the station,
needed to improve. None dismissed the entire
station as ill disciplined. Senior members tended
to see the younger as comparatively ill disciplined:
It's not bad but it's not the way it should be. I
joined in 1994 and discipline was right then…
it's not out of control but it's not the way it
should be. (Commissioned officer, crime
prevention)
It was a commonly held belief by lower ranking
officers that poor communication was responsible
for poor discipline. This is expanded upon below.
Parades observed during the fieldwork indicated a
good level of discipline among shift/crime
prevention members.6 Members stood at attention
and listened attentively to their commander.
Although compulsory, formal parades are not
held at all stations. 
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Knowledge of SAPS rules and
regulations
Almost all respondents believed their colleagues
had a good knowledge of SAPS rules, regulations,
codes and standing orders. The few who said that
some rules were not known or understood
believed that more experienced colleagues were
familiar with rules and regulations while the more
junior weren't. They tended to blame poor
communication for the lack of awareness by their
less experienced colleagues.
Relationships between
commissioned and 
non-commissioned officers
In an interview the former station commissioner
articulated what is probably an ideal relationship
between junior and senior colleagues, saying
[it should be] relatively cordial, there has to be a
good relationship between juniors and seniors,
but not overly familiar to the point where
people call each other by first names.7
He believed this described the relationships
between members at Honeydew. While other
respondents agreed that relationships were 'mostly
good', many respondents suggested that 'good'
went far beyond 'cordial'. It is unclear whether
this aided the maintenance of discipline and
effective policing, though it seems fair to presume
good relationships are better than bad. 
Some members believed there was respect for the
rank hierarchy at the station while others
suggested this was no longer the case, particularly
at an operational level. They believed this was
partly because an increasing number of
commissioned officers were working at an
operational level, whereas before they had station-
bound managerial positions. Experienced
members recounted how in the past (anywhere
between ten and twenty years ago) a single
sergeant, inspector, or equivalent rank, was
afforded immense respect. 
Currently, however, even the rank of inspector
may be considered a low rank in a large station
such as Honeydew. Some respondents perceive
this to be because captains and superintendents
themselves work 'outside', on patrols, or with
multiple commissioned officers in the CSC, with
numerous inspectors and sergeants beneath them.
It was suggested that this dilutes the authority of
the more senior ranking staff. At Honeydew two
captains and a superintendent oversee each shift.
As one detective constable put it, 'There are so
many managers on duty… a supt, captain,
inspectors… where there are so many, someone
doesn't know his job.' But from the former station
commissioner's perspective, these numbers
strengthened oversight.
Respondents made reference to the fact that
officers working 'outside' (on patrols and crime
prevention) aided the formation of friendships
and good relations between juniors and seniors. It
is unclear from this data whether the benefits of
this outweigh possible negatives. 
An assessment of the interview and observational
data suggests that both relationships and
discipline at this station are healthy. This is
corroborated by the views expressed by
respondents. One member felt she could contact
her commander at any time of the day or night,
with both personal and work-related problems.
However, complaints about poor internal
communication by respondents also suggest that
good personal relations do not facilitate official
communication. 
EFFORTS TO REDUCE OR PREVENT
CORRUPTION
The former station commissioner emphasised
that station commissioners have an immense
amount of work on their plates, the most pressing
of which is responding to, and investigating,
crime. With this pressure, managers are likely to
let the monitoring and improvement of integrity
and the prevention of corruption fall by the
wayside. In addition, given the pressure to reduce
crime, any indication that crime is being reduced
is unlikely to be questioned, even if the manner in
which the reduction is being achieved is
 
questionable. During his tenure, the former
commissioner set four management priorities,
one of which was corruption. He believed that if
corruption management was not prioritised, it
would be forgotten.
Most members could cite examples of how
management had addressed corruption. Many
emphasised parade and station lectures covering
the consequences of police crime and corruption.
A few referred to examples of members being
disciplined internally or even dismissed for their
involvement in corrupt activities. 
While very few members said there weren't any
initiatives to address corruption at the station,
none could suggest any proactive attempts to
detect corruption. This is a matter of concern,
considering that members could only think of
one instance in which an employee had reported
a colleague for corruption. This 'code of silence' is
considered common in police agencies. Of
further concern is that many members explicitly
stated they would not report corruption. 
It's none of my business, I must just do my job and
stay out of it. (Constable, shifts)8
It would be so difficult because the police officer
has a gun so going behind his back is suicide. All I
can do is communicate with him. (Constable, shifts)
It's difficult to report your colleague but I can talk
to them [about their crime]. There's a problem of
trust. You report someone and then the person you
reported goes to the suspect and tells them.
(Constable, detectives)
When we hear there has been a special [anti-
corruption/organised crime] unit [at the
station]…we don't provide them with
information...Because you don't get support. At the
end of the day you have an attitude of 'who cares?'
(Constable, shifts)
I was a constable and I know that what happens
outside stays outside. Generally members would
cover each other. (Commissioned officer, crime
prevention)
I would just tell [the corrupt member] to stop. [If I
report it] my colleagues will make me suffer for
doing it. (Constable, shifts)
These comments both reinforce and contradict
the claims made about good relationships. On the
one hand they suggest an allegiance to colleagues,
and a sense that the relationship between
colleagues is more important than official
corrective action or punishment. On the other
hand, allusions to possible betrayal or lack of
support suggest deeply faulted relationships. 
The above responses emerged through
conversation and were not part of the formal
interview structure. In the same way, three non-
commissioned officers said they would definitely
report corruption. Though no commissioned
officers made it clear that they would or wouldn't
report corruption, three of the five gave the
impression that they would.
THE SAPS AND CORRUPTION AT
HONEYDEW 
Eighty-five per cent of respondents believed
corruption was a problem in the SAPS. Many
respondents seem to base their perceptions on
reports of police corruption in the media.9 Others
said they heard members of the public and
colleagues talking about police corruption, and
felt that the inability of the SAPS to reduce crime
was evidence of corruption. Three members said
they were aware of corruption taking place in the
recruitment process. 
Drawing parallels between the national picture
and Honeydew, a shift constable said, 'whatever
Honeydew officers can do, other officers can do',
expressing her suspicion of corruption at
Honeydew and the SAPS as a whole.
Only two officers reported direct knowledge of
corruption at the station, though more than half
could clearly describe the type of corruption they
believed was likely occurring. One detective
alleged that almost everyone on his shift was
involved in corrupt activities, including the shift
commander. Another said she knew many
members who accepted bribes, and that in her
experience, roughly ten per cent of suspects
offered bribes. A student detective expressed his
14 Institute for Security Studies
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suspicions of seniors who complained of not
having food money but ended road block
operations buying excessive amounts of food and
drink. Another respondent alleged that some
detectives provided protection to drug dealers.
Others claimed to have heard of colleagues
extorting money from illegal immigrants.
Although none admitted to being party to such
extortion, one respondent responsible for crime
prevention said it probably happened on his shift.
A young detective acknowledged that he would not
ask somebody to pay a bribe, but that if he were
offered one he would accept it.
Significantly, a number of members believed that
corruption had been notably reduced under the
former station commissioner. This view was
echoed by the chair of the CPF who stated that
'many, many, many' allegations of corruption are
raised at CPF meetings.10 He claimed that it was
generally the poorer and more vulnerable members
of the community who were targeted, and alleged
that some members demanded payment from
complainants before assisting them, and negotiated
bribes with suspects before arresting them.
Throughout the interview process, a number of
respondents made reference to examples of
corruption uncovered at the station over the past
three years. These included:
• Five members selling blank (stamped and 
signed) affidavits to immigrants and supplying
civilians with police radios 
• A student instructed by his senior to release a 
suspect from a holding cell
• A detective caught while arranging to have a 
suspect's case withdrawn 
• Members demanding money from illegal 
shebeens
• A member accepting a bribe from suspects 
arrested for being drunk in public
It was concerning that many employees had no
knowledge of these incidents, and none knew of
more than two. This means that even though
action was taken against corrupt officials, this was
not communicated to the whole staff, thus losing
the deterrent value.
Two black respondents alleged that white officers
gave white suspects preferential treatment. This
was perceived as a form of 'racist corruption'.
While not technically corrupt, the perception is of
a station culture in which rules are bent. 
PERCEIVED CAUSES OF
CORRUPTION AND HOW TO
PREVENT IT
When asked what they thought caused corruption,
and what could be done to prevent it, respondents
emphasised that better communication, better
leadership and improved salaries would contribute
towards improving integrity at the station. 
Communication
Members suggested that in order to reduce
corruption the station needed to:
Have good communication (Civilian, detectives)
Communicate with members, get more involved
in knowing them (Inspector, detectives)
[Realise that] consultation is key (Inspector,
shifts)
[Hold] regular meetings with the rest of the
station (Probationary student, detectives)
[Realise that] communication would have a
positive influence on our daily tasks (Constable,
shifts)
In contrast, a commissioned officer expressed
frustration that his junior colleagues don't seem to
listen. 
I don't know what needs to be done because you
talk about [corruption] but they don't take you
seriously (Commissioned officer, detectives)
While this respondent may believe that
communication doesn't help, the comments
quoted above should not be ignored. Rather, it
would seem that those in management positions
should consider new and creative forms of
communication over and above existing systems
such as the Incident Book (IB).
 
16 Institute for Security Studies
Leadership and training 
Respondents also believed that better leadership
was needed to reduce corruption. The fact that
ten respondents believed there was a need for
them to be more motivated suggests that poor
communication may be a cause of low morale.
They identified various needs:
Motivation. (Sergeant, shifts)
Commanders must lead by example.
(Probationary student, crime prevention)
Motivate the people. (Constable, shifts)
More motivation. (Inspector, detectives)
I don't think there is anything we are doing to
educate them. (Commissioned officer, crime
prevention)
Better training. (Constable, shifts)
More courses so we know what is wrong and
right. (Inspector, shifts)
Teaching the students while in college.
(Commissioned officer, crime prevention)
Give credit where it's due. (Constable,
detectives)
Let them promote us and recognise our
qualifications, just motivate us. (Constable,
shifts)
Increased salaries
Few discussions about corruption in the police are
without reference to salaries. At Honeydew almost
all non-commissioned officers drew a direct link
between corruption and (perceived) poor salaries.
In response to the question: 'What factors do you
think cause members to engage in corrupt or
criminal activity?' the following answers emerged:
Increase the salaries of the police, then you can
consider corruption serious, if they are being
paid enough. (Constable, shifts)
We are under paid. (Constable, shifts)
Some don't want to do it but they don't have
another way. (Constable, shifts)
No reason other than money. I know money
will never be enough but if I take out my salary
and look at it now, it's month end, but by
Monday it will be finished. (Constable, shifts)
When asked why commissioned officers with
higher salaries were also implicated in corruption,
non-commissioned respondents replied that they
did not know, speculating that maybe their
seniors were greedy, or that they couldn't change
the habits developed earlier in their careers. 
The views of student constables, reservists and
very junior civilian staff are revealing. Students
earn between R1 600 and R4 000, depending on
how far into their training they are. Reservists at
most stations receive no remuneration, though at
Honeydew they have periodically received
stipends sponsored by the CPF. Entry-level
civilian posts tend to pay around R4 000 a month. 
These categories of staff are somewhat removed
from the main body of police at the station
(students to a lesser extent), so often used 'they'
rather than 'we' when discussing salaries.
Nevertheless, many of them agreed that 'they'
(police) don't earn enough, despite earning far
less themselves. When asked why they thought
some police engaged in corruption, these
comparatively low earning staff said:
I can't tell you what's going on with these people
[to make them get involved in corruption when
they earn well]. (Probationary student, shifts)
I don't know but a lot of things could push them
to do [corruption], wanting extra cash or
something like that. (Civilian, detectives)
Some they say they receive too little money so
they want a salary increase, but I don't know.
(Field training student, shifts)
These comparatively low earners did not agree
that low salaries cause corruption. One constable
expressed his view that corruption occurs
'…because of money. They have enough but don't
understand [how to manage it]'.  Another
constable believed that 'people don't want to be
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satisfied, money is a problem for everyone', while
a probationary student said she could support
herself comfortably on her R4 000 a month salary
and couldn't understand why others complained. 
The civilian, reservist and students below did
believe that low salaries were a main cause of
corruption:
Greed and money, they don't have enough.
(Civilian, detectives)
If someone commits corruption it means they
do not have enough finance. They must pay
them good salaries. (Reservist sergeant, shifts)
Everyone knows the police don't earn enough,
you stop someone at a roadblock and they say
'Take R500, I know you don't earn'.
(Probationary student, detectives)
Money, we earn peanuts… if new recruits see
that we are earning a living salary we cannot
think of involving ourselves in corruption.
(Probationary student, detectives)
By including 'greed' in her justification, the
civilian implies that low salaries were not the sole
cause of corruption. On the other hand the
reservist, who volunteered on a full-time basis did
think that low salaries were to blame for
corruption, thus accepting what appears to be the
dominant discourse about the causes of police
corruption. Most alarming are the probationary
students' comments, because these suggest that
within their first 16 months a student may learn
to use salaries to justify corruption. The last quote
suggests that new recruits will adopt this
justification as soon as they enter the station. 
Commissioned officers were less likely to support
the argument that corruption is the result of low
salaries, although this was not uniformly the case,
as the quotes below from interviews show:
It's useless if officers are paid more, you can pay
them more and they will still continue… it
doesn't mean that if I don't have money today
then I must go and be corrupt. (Commissioned
officer, detectives)
Greed. I don't want to say being underpaid
because generally I wouldn't say members are
underpaid. It's greed and opportunity.
(Commissioned officer, crime prevention)
The former station commissioner approached the
issue slightly differently, saying:
We need to review the policy on extra-
remunerative work… if you look at the current
economic climate you realise that you need
more money to survive… so police should be
able to work on their days off… cost of living is
higher [in different provinces] but you don't
earn more… so salary is always an issue but not
a justification.11
Two commissioned officers embraced the salary-
corruption justification:
Maybe if members get paid enough, maybe they
can stop. (Commissioned officer, crime
prevention)
Honesty and integrity are linked to salary. They
must throw something heavy in our pocket so
that maybe we can reduce corruption.
(Commissioned officer, shifts)
Respondents who supported the view that
corruption is linked to salary levels were asked
what salary they thought would be sufficient to
prevent corruption. A constable's salary was used
as a baseline. Answers ranged from R7 000 to
R15 000 with an average of R10 500 after
deductions.  Importantly, constables do start at 
R7 000 (before deductions), though their
maximum salary of R8 500 is not a significant
increase.
KNOWLEDGE OF SAPS ANTI-
CORRUPTION STRATEGIES,
STRUCTURES AND HOTLINES
The interviews probed whether employees had any
knowledge of organisation-wide efforts, strategies
or mechanisms to aid in the control and reduction
of corruption. Besides the obvious attempt to
gauge members' overall knowledge, it was
expected that these questions would demonstrate
whether the respondents had any knowledge of
the CFPP. Only two respondents, one of whom
was the former station commissioner, were aware
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of formal strategies to reduce and control
corruption.
Twelve respondents were aware of some sort of
anti-corruption hotline, though none knew the
number and most did not mention it until asked
specifically if they knew of the existence of such
a hotline. Below are some of the more typical
answers to questions about the hotline:
They even have a number to phone. I don't know
what the number is but I saw it somewhere, 0800-
blah-blah-blah-blah. (Constable, shifts)
We have a hotline but we usually refer them to
10111. I don't know the number of the other line.
(Commissioned officer, crime prevention)
I don't know about a hotline. (Reservist
constable, 
shifts)
I know the JMPD have a hotline, we don't have
one but we have Crime Stop [10111].
(Commissioned officer, crime prevention)
We don't have a hotline, I have not come across 
one. (Commissioned officer, shifts)
There is a SAPS hotline. The number is 10111
and another 0800-something. (Constable, shifts)
Incredibly, an LED (electronic) panel screen in
the station's CSC periodically flashed the
message, Please Report Corrupt Activity: 0800
701 701. The number is the Public Service
Commission's national anti-corruption hotline
punted within the organisation through posters
and other communication. The responses seem
to suggest that this form of communication is
ineffective.
Other structures mentioned by respondents
included an anti-corruption unit (mentioned
four times, although it does not exist any longer
and has not existed for the past seven years),
crime intelligence (n=1), organised crime (n=1),
and 'those people dealing with corruption'.
General standing orders, policies and
disciplinary structures were also seen to
contribute to integrity management, though not
through any specific focus on corruption.
The former station commissioner had copies of
the framework on which the CFPP was founded
and had tailored this to fit the station.
Nevertheless, the only other references made to
any formal strategy were the following:
There is supposed to be a strategy, I think they
have one. (Inspector, shifts)
Yes they do. There was a draft… I think there
was a policy, we had to talk about it at the
lectures and it gave instruction, clear indication
on who to go to. (Commissioned officer,
detectives)
CONCLUSION
The primary objective of this case study was to
ascertain the extent and manner in which the
Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan (CFPP)
had been implemented at Honeydew SAPS. It
became clear early on in the study that it had not
been implemented. This had been the predicted
finding. The secondary objective – to probe the
organisational culture of the station with regards
to integrity and corruption – offered valuable
insights into the way in which the police view
corruption, supporting the following analysis:
• The management of integrity and corruption 
is undermined by a general lack of morale
among many employees. The belief that
salaries are too low, that leadership and
communication are poor, and that staff are
unmotivated, suggest a general disaffection.
However, it should also be noted that, since
the interviews showed that the interpersonal
relationships between juniors and seniors were
good, the basis for improvement exists 
• These factors described above contribute to a 
station culture in which students potentially
learn corrupt practices that are retained as
they climb the rank hierarchy
• Sympathy for colleagues involved in 
corruption, fear of retribution or ambivalence
suggest a culture in which whistle blowing is
highly unlikely to manifest
• There is little deterrent advantage currently 
gained from the disciplining of corrupt
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officials since few, if any, seem to be aware of
it. In addition, efforts to address corruption,
however commendable, are apparently ad-hoc
despite the commissioner's strategy, again
undermining any deterrent effect action may
have
• There is overall little knowledge of existing 
mechanisms to counter and report corruption
• The perception that corruption pervades the 
organisation, even if not directly within
Honeydew, threatens employee pride and trust
in the organisation
Station management alone cannot be blamed for
the negative attitudes revealed though the
interviews. Indeed, it would appear that the
former station commissioner at Honeydew took
corruption more seriously than most. One of the
problems seems to be that there is little evidence
that Gauteng Strategic Management has
effectively disseminated the CFPP to station level.
This may be due to delays from head office, or
may demonstrate a lack of will or know-how,
though there is evidence that momentum is
slowly building.  
Regardless of where the fault lies, it is concerning
that, even under the leadership of a committed
and motivated commissioner, the findings suggest
a culture of mistrust, dishonesty, and fear. It is
evident that managing corruption at the
Honeydew station will require more than a single
anti-corruption strategy. Rather, it will need to
take into account the many variables threatening
the culture of the station. 
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
NOTES
1 Following this first case study a minor adjustment will 
be made to the selection of stations. The new method
will still focus on priority stations but will also be
based on the SAPS performance chart.
2 The commissioner (an assistant commissioner by rank 
and position) had served as head of the station for two
and a half years. His successor had taken up her post
six days prior to the commencement of research. It was
therefore deemed more advantageous to the study to
interview the former commissioner regarding his
tenure and knowledge of the station. As the former
station commissioner at Hillbrow, he actively and
successfully tackled corruption. More recently he has
served as part of a small expert advisory group to
Gauteng SAPS management regarding provincial
initiatives to tackle corruption. 
3 See for example: Carl Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, 
Maria Haberfeld (eds.), The Contours of Police
Integrity, California: Sage Publications, 2003.
4 Research currently being conducted by researchers at 
the Forced Migration Project at the University of the
Witwatersrand has as its main focus the observation of
SAPS members' engagement with immigrants outside
the station. This research is due to be released in late
2009 and should complement the case studies being
pursued by the ISS. 
5 Because commissioned officers are comparatively 
scarce, mention of the rank and division of an officer
would make them easily identifiable to somebody at
the station. 
6 Strictly speaking, parades should be held at the 
beginning and end of all shifts. Important information
is to be communicated and members are to be
inspected and posted. 
7 A Faull, Thursday 5 February 2009. Interview with 
Assistant-Commissioner Reddy, former station
commissioner, Honeydew SAPS.
8 'Shifts' is police-speak referring to uniformed members 
who work in the Community Service Centre and
attend to general complaints. Although the shifts
perform a crime prevention function, 'crime
prevention' units exist as separate entities. Crime
prevention members work shifts structured around
crime patterns, and generally only respond to priority
complaints, while 'shifts' work according to a set
rotation schedule and must attend to all complaints. 
9 This raises important questions around the 
responsibility of the media in generating negative
perceptions of the SAPS both among the public and
those within the organisation.
10 A Faull, 25 March 2009. Telephonic interview with 
Mr John Bailey. 
11 A Faull, Thursday 5 February 2009. Interview with 
Assistant-Commissioner Reddy, former station
commissioner, Honeydew SAPS.
12 SAPS members make a contribution to medical and 
pension funds which are then added to by the state.
For most the 'insufficient salary' refers to earnings
after these and tax deductions.
